

# Ignorance as Epistemic Etiquette

*a philosophy talk by*

**Rima Basu**

(Claremon McKenna College)

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To call someone ignorant is to insult them. It is not surprising then that much of the philosophical literature on ignorance has focused on its harms. In this paper, Professor Basu argues that there are morally laudable cases of ignorance. Ignorance, as a kind of epistemic etiquette, protects inquiry from turning into an inquisition, questioning from turning into prying. When we indulge in over-curiosity we risk a range of inquisitive wrongs; we risk failing to give others the respect they are owed not just in how we act towards them, but also in how they figure in our inquiries. Two complications arise, however, in determining how to understand ignorance as epistemic etiquette. First, many examples of hermeneutical injustice rely on the disadvantaged not questioning the status quo, of not being curious. Second, to determine whether one should be ignorant about something may require inquiring into that thing in the first place. Professor Basu shows why, despite these complications, epistemic etiquette is a promising resource for distinguishing one class of morally permissible ignorance.